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The economic theory states that the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant in a perfect frictionless world. Hence when the 
assumptions of the Modigliani–Miller theorem and the CAPM hold, the question about the optimal source of funding of capital 
investments is also irrelevant. In practice though, capital leasing is widely used and the decision to lease or own assets is hardly a 
matter of indifference to firms or individuals. The motivation of this thesis is to identify when and why leasing would be a preferred 
method of finance. 
 
The Modigliani–Miller indifference proposition assumes rational value maximizing agents that have perfect and symmetric 
information available, and have access to perfect capital markets when making decisions on investments to divisible assets under 
a neutral tax system. In reality though the future cash-flows from capital investments are almost always uncertain at the time of an 
investment decision, the access to risk free borrowing is limited and the size of capital investments have technical limitations. The 
indifference proposition, however, holds even if the future cash flows are uncertain as long as the assumptions of the CAPM are 
valid. 
 
Instead the asymmetry of information is a critical violation of assumptions for the indifference proposition. First asymmetry on 
information on management performance may induce risk averse management to prefer relatively safe leasing instead of own 
equipment when there is uncertainty on the future value of the asset. On the other hand the information asymmetry on the usage 
of the asset may cause an agent–principal problem between the lessor and the lessee increasing the cost of leasing. This in turn 
may cause an adverse selection problem where only users who cause greater wear and tear on the asset utilize leasing. 
 
The indifference proposition also ceases to apply when investments can be made only in fixed quantities and access to risk-free 
borrowing is limited. A risk-averse investor cannot then diversify the asset specific risk related to owning the asset through the 
market. Leasing, however, provides a way to de-risk a capital investment since the risk in the residual value of the leased asset is 
carried by the lessor. 
 
Limited access to risk-free credit causes also another problem that creates demand for leasing. Normally 100% debt finance is not 
possible since repossession of collateralized assets is costly. Therefore lenders require part of the investment to be made with 
internal funds so that in case of a default the creditor can recover both the loan principal and the repossession costs. Meanwhile in 
case of leasing the lessor retains the title to the asset and there is no deadweight cost of repossession. For agents with limited 
internal funds leasing can then offer a way to expand capacity faster than would be possible when financing the investment with 
internal and borrowed funds. 
 
The impact of taxation on the validity of the Modigliani–Miller theorem has been actively researched and widely documented in the 
context of determining the optimal mix of debt and equity in the capital structure of a firm. Not surprisingly taxation also distorts the 
indifference proposition in case of lease or buy decision. When there are differences in the marginal tax rates between firms, there 
exists an opportunity for tax arbitrage when lessee companies with lower marginal tax rates lease assets from lessor companies 
with higher marginal tax rates.  
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1 Introduction
One of the cornerstones of modern corporate finance is the Modigliani–Miller the-
orem. The key result of the theorem is a proposition that the capital structure of
a firm is irrelevant in perfect frictionless world. Modigliani (1980, p. xii) explains
the theorem as follows:
... with well-functioning markets (and neutral taxes) and rational
investors, who can ‘undo’ the corporate financial structure by holding
positive or negative amounts of debt, the market value of the firm –
debt plus equity – depends only on the income stream generated by its
assets. It follows, in particular, that the value of the firm should not be
a ected by the share of debt in its financial structure or by what will be
done with the returns – paid out as dividends or reinvested (profitably).
The underlying assumptions behind the Modigliani–Miller theorem are (i) tax neu-
trality (ii) no transaction costs (iii) symmetric information (iv) complete contracting
and (v) complete markets. (see e.g. Graham, 2003, Villamil, 2008).
The Modigliani–Miller theorem also forms the foundation of the theory on leasing
finance. In a neoclassical view the rental terms o ered by a lessor have to reflect the
underlying cost of owning the asset subject to the lease contract, that is interest and
depreciation. For a lessee the choice between leasing or buying an asset would then
depend only on the relative cost of these options. In a perfectly competitive market
for lease contracts with no taxes and where everyone is facing the same interest rates,
the quoted lease rates would adjust until the financial costs of leasing and buying
were equal. Hence firms should be indi erent on whether to lease or buy assets. In
practice though whether to lease or buy is usually not a matter of indi erence to
firms (Miller and Upton, 1976, p. 762) and both leasing and debt/equity financing
are coexisting.
In addition to financial costs, acquiring the services of capital goods involve non-
financial costs of procurement, maintenance, repair and disposal. Separating the
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ownership and use of the capital goods can create opportunities for specialization
and greater e ciency in these separate roles. In some cases pursuing these e ciencies
can become the decisive factor for a company considering between leasing and owning
an asset. This thesis focuses, however, on pure financial lease contracts where the
lessor’s role is solely that of a financier.
The objective of this thesis is to identify factors that determine the value of financial
lease contracts. The question to be answered is why and under which conditions
companies as well as individuals should utilize leasing rather than debt or equity to
finance their capital investment projects.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides first a general descrip-
tion of leasing and financial lease contracts. Chapters 3 and 4 lay the foundation
of the analysis by studying leasing within the neoclassical framework. Chapter 5
then substitutes the neoclassical value maximizing firm with a more generic utility
maximizing agent. The key point of interest in Chapter 5 is how risk aversion and
di erences in expectations influence the lease or buy decision.
The impact of taxes on the Modigliani–Miller theorem is one of the most studied
areas in corporate finance and Chapter 6 continues on this tradition by showing how
leasing can be used as vehicle for tax arbitrage. Chapter 7 then relaxes assumptions
about symmetric information and complete markets. Chapter 7 presents how limited
access to borrowed funds combined with an agent–principal problem can lead to a
situation where leasing is a preferred by agents with limited internal funds, because
it o ers a way to expand capacity faster than would be possible when financing the
investment with external funds.
2
2 Description of Financial Lease
Contracts
Creation of financial lease contracts and related transactions are depicted in Figure
2.1 on page 3 (Tepora, 1988, pp. 249-257):
Figure 2.1: Leasing parties and transactions.
1. The seller and the customer (lessee) negotiate about the object of the contract.
2. The seller makes an o er to the lessor concerning buying the object to be
leased to the named customer. The o er includes approval of the o er from
the customer.
3. When the lessor approves the o er, a sales contract between the lessor and the
seller, and a leasing contract between the lessor and the lessee is made. The
sales contract can also include provisions about the seller buying the object
back at the end of the lease period. Likewise the lease contract can contain
provisions about the lessee having an option to buy the object at the end of
the lease period.
4. The lessor orders the object to be delivered to the lessee.
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5. The seller delivers the object to the lessee and sends the invoice to the lessor.
6. Typically the lessee pays the first lease payment when the invoice is due and
the subsequent payments are due at the beginning of each lease period.
7. At the end of the lease contract the lessee returns the depreciated object to
the lessor. If the sales contract between the lessor and the seller included a
provision for buyback, it is exercised and the object is returned to the seller.
Alternatively if the lease contract has an option for extending the lease period
or acquire the depreciated object, the lessee can exercise these options.
A characteristic feature of leasing is separation of ownership and control of the leased
asset with the lessee receiving the benefits of use and the lessor receiving the value of
the lease payments plus the residual value of the asset (Grenadier, 1995). In practice
this separation is not, however, discrete, but there is a continuum of di erent types
of lease contracts where the degree of control over the asset between the lessor and
the lessee varies. In financial lease contracts, that this thesis is focusing at, the
lessor has the ownership of the asset while the lessee has full control over it.
4
3 The Neoclassical Analysis
A neoclassical model provides a natural starting point for analyzing leasing mar-
kets. To begin with, we assume the following technological, financial and market
conditions (Miller and Upton, 1976, pp. 763-764):
1. The capital leased are produced by perfectly competitive industry at a constant
cost of ct per unit of capital k at time t. The same capital will be produced
by the industry again at time t + 1 at cost ct+1, that can be higher or lower
than ct.
2. The capital deteriorates over time and a unit of capital produced at time t
can produce the same service flow in period t + 1 as (1 ≠ ”t) new units. The
rate of deterioration is endogenous and independent of whether the user of the
capital owns or leases it.
3. Used capital can be bought, sold and sublet in any quantities in perfect, com-
petitive markets.
4. There is a perfect financial market where companies can borrow and lend
in unlimited quantities at a known one-period interest rate rt. Furthermore
there are no entry barriers to leasing business and both producers and users
of capital can have their own leasing subsidiaries.
5. The cost of capital goods ct, rate of deterioration ”t and interest rate rt are
known for certainty for all t.
3.1 Lessor’s analysis
Since the capital is produced by a perfectly competitive industry, the producers earn
zero profits and the price of the capital must equal the production cost. Moreover
as the production cost is constant, the demand for capital has no impact on the unit
price of the capital but only on the quantity employed.
5
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The present value of a one period lease contract for a lessor at time t is then
Vc =
A
lt ≠ ct + (1≠ ”t) ct+11 + rt
B
kl (3.1)
where lt is period t lease rate per unit of leased capital kl produced at the beginning
of period t. That is, the lessor incurs a cost of ctkl to obtain the title to capital kl,
receives the lease payment ltkl at the beginning of period t, and gets the salvage
value of the depreciated capital (1 ≠ ”t)ct+1kl at time t + 1. Notice, that since the
rate of deterioration ”t and cost of capital ct are known for certain, the cash flow at
time t+ 1 can be discounted using the risk free interest rate rt.
The leasing market was assumed perfectly competitive and hence all the lessors
make zero profit, Vc = 0. Using (3.1), we get the equilibrium one-period lease rate
l*t =
rtct + ”tct+1 + ct ≠ ct+1
1 + rt
(3.2)
where rtct is the opportunity cost of capital, i.e. interest forgone on the capital
invested, ”tct+1 is the cost of asset deterioration and ct ≠ ct+1 is the obsolescence
cost of one period old capital at time t+ 1.
If the ongoing rental rate were to increase above the equilibrium level, lt > l*t , higher
than normal returns would attract new entrants buying capital at the constant price
ct and cutting the prevailing rental rate until it reaches it’s equilibrium level l*t . If,
on the other hand, the ongoing rental rate would fall below the equilibrium level,
lt < l*t , the owners of the capital would be strictly better o  by selling their capital
at the constant price ct and invest the proceeds of the sale in capital markets to earn
interest rtctkl. The lessors would be then exiting from the market until the lease
rate reached the equilibrium level l*t .
3.2 Lessee’s analysis
Employing capital k the lessee gets service flow f(k), that is assumed increasing
in k, ˆf(k)ˆk > 0. f(k) can be thought as a production function where the lessee’s
value is derived from selling the goods produced. f(k) can also represent e.g. the
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intrinsic value of housing services obtained by renting an apartment. The capital, k,
can either be bought or leased with both types of capital being perfect substitutes.
That is k = kb+ kl , where kb is bought, owned capital and kl is leased capital. The
present value of the lessee’s value from employing capital k is then
Vd =
f(k) + (1≠ ”t)ct+1kb
1 + rt
≠ ltkl ≠ ctkb (3.3)
where the first term is the present value of the cash flow at time t+1, that is the sum
of the service flow from the capital and the salvage value of the purchased capital.
The second term is the lease payment made at time t and the last term is the cost
of the purchased capital. Using (3.2) gives the lessee’s value at the equilibrium
V úd =
f(k) + (1≠ ”t)ct+1(kb + kl)
1 + rt
≠ ct(kb + kl)
= f(k) + (1≠ ”t)ct+1k1 + rt ≠ ctk
and hence the value derived by the lessee depends only on the total amount of capital
employed and is independent of the financing decision.
This result has an intuitive explanation recognizing that a common abstraction made
in economics is to consider having the title to the capital and using it as two separate
economic activities. Therefore, we can without loss of generality, consider a company
that owns the capital goods it employs equal to a lessee company having it’s own
leasing subsidiary. The lease rate the in-house leasing subsidiary should charge is the
market equilibrium lease rate, since any other lease rate in internal transfer pricing
would result in ine cient use of capital. Obviously for purely financial reasons the
user of the capital goods is then indi erent whether to lease the capital from an
outside lessor company or from the in-house leasing subsidiary as the lease rate is
same in both cases. On the other hand, we concluded in the previous section that
in a perfectly competitive leasing market, lessors always earn zero profits. Hence
there is no purely economical reason for a user of capital goods to buy into the
leasing business, and consequently the firms should be indi erent between buying
and leasing capital. (Miller and Upton, 1976, p. 764)
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3.3 Valuing long term leases
In reality lease contracts are often long term leases extending over multiple periods.
In neoclassical world the conclusions are, however, still fundamentally the same as in
case of one period lease contracts analyzed in the previous sections. In the absence
of transaction and search costs, the equilibrium value of an n-period lease must be
equal to n equilibrium one-period leases. If the equilibrium value of an n-period long
term lease was lower than the sum of n one-period rentals, lessors would be better
o  by o ering only one-period leases and the long-term lease rates would increase
until they would o er the same return as the one-period leases. If, on the other
hand, the value of a equilibrium n-period long term lease was higher than the value
of n short term leases, lessors would be strictly better o  by making n one period
rentals instead of one n-period long term lease. The lessors would continue to move
from long term lease to short term leases until the value of the leases were equal.
In order to determine the equilibrium value of an n-period lease, consider first the
equilibrium lease rate at period t+ 1. At time t+ 1 the lessee can either lease new
capital or one period old capital providing the same service flow as (1 ≠ ”t) new
units. Obviously the equilibrium rental rate of one period old capital has to be
then (1≠ ”t)lút+1. If the rental rate of old capital was higher than the rental rate of
new capital adjusted for the asset deterioration, all the lessees would rent only new
capital that under our assumptions is o ered in any quantities at constant rental rate
lút+1. On the other hand, if the rental rate of old capital were to fall below (1≠”t)lút+1,
the lessor’s owning old capital would get a better return by selling old deteriorated
capital than by renting it. Using (3.2), and assuming that the depreciation rate and
market rate of interest are constant over time, i.e. rt = r and ”t = ” , we get the
present value of an n-period long term lease contract:
V (n) =
nÿ
t=1
l*t (1≠ ”)t≠1kl
(1 + r)t≠1 + cn
A
1≠ ”
1 + r
Bn
kl ≠ c1kl
where L(n) = qnt=1 l*t (1≠”)t≠1kl(1+r)t≠1 is the present value of the n one-period equilibrium
lease payments, cn
1
1≠”
1+r
2n
kl is the salvage value of the used n periods old capital
and the c1kl is the purchase price of the leased capital at the beginning of the lease
contract.
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In long term leases it is often a practice to set the periodical rental rates constant
over the duration of the lease contract. In the neoclassical world the agents are
indi erent between any cash flows that have the same present value and hence:
L(n) =
nÿ
t=1
l*kl
(1 + r)t≠1 =
1 + r ≠ (1 + r)1≠n
r
lúkl (3.4)
where lú is the uniform equilibrium rental rate for n-period rental and the second
equality follows directly from the properties of geometrical series. Solving (3.4) for
lú gives the uniform equilibrium rental rate:
lú = r(1 + r)
n≠1
(1 + r)n ≠ 1
L(n)
kl
where r(1+r)n≠1(1+r)n≠1 is the capital recovery factor. (Miller and Upton, 1976, p. 765)
If the lease covers the economical life the asset so that the salvage value of the
leased capital at the end of the lease contract is zero, cn
1
1≠”
1+r
2n
kl = 0 and the
leasing market is perfectly competitive, V (n) = 0, then the uniform equilibrium
rental rate becomes:
lú = r(1 + r)
n≠1
(1 + r)n ≠ 1c1 (3.5)
This is also the formula for an n-period annuity, which is logical considering that
when the length of a lease contract equals the economical life of the asset, an n-
period lease contract with uniform rental rate is essentially equal to financing the
purchase of the asset with an annuity loan. In practice, leasing an asset is often
more e cient than owning it if the expected economical life of the asset is greater
than the expected need for it, since selling an asset is costly (Smith C., Wakeman
L., 1985).
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uncertainty
For durable goods there are risks involved with the market value of the asset since
in reality, the cost of following period capital goods, ct+1, and depreciation rate, ”t,
are rarely known in advance. In the following two chapters we study the impact of
relaxing simplifying assumption 5 on page 5 and allow for uncertainty in the future
cost of capital goods and depreciation rate. Here we assume that the lease payment
is made at the beginning of the lease period and thus the lease rate lt is known in
advance. The valuation framework used is the Sharpe–Lintner capital asset pricing
model (later CAPM), which implies the following assumptions (Jensen, 1979, pp.
23-24):
1. All investors choose portfolios on the basis of their single period mean and
variance of return.
2. All investors can borrow or lend at a given riskless rate of interest and there
are no restrictions on short sales of any asset.
3. All investors have identical subjective estimates of the joint probability distri-
bution on the returns of all assets.
4. All assets are perfectly liquid and divisible.
5. There are no taxes.
6. The quantities of all assets are given and all investors are price takers.
Under the assumptions of the CAPM, the expected equilibrium rate of return on
any asset is (see e.g. Jensen, 1979, p. 24, Jagannathan and McGrattan, 1995, p. 3):
E(r) = rf + — [E(rm)≠ rf ] (4.1)
11
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where rf is the risk free rate of return, E(rm) is the expected rate of return on the to-
tal wealth and — = Cov(r, rm)/Var(rm) is a measure of the relative, nondiversifiable
risk of the asset in question.
4.1 Lessor’s analysis
From the view point of a leasing company the leased asset is like any other asset
and it has return:
rl =
(1≠ ”˜t)ct
ct ≠ lt ≠ 1 (4.2)
where ”˜t = 1≠ (1≠ ”t) ctct+1 is the economic depreciation of the asset, (1≠ ”˜t)ct is the
uncertain cash flow from selling a unit of the depreciated capital asset in the future at
time t+1, and ct≠lt is the (certain) net cash flow at time t after making the payment
for the capital and collecting the lease payment. Notice that all the uncertainty in
rl is now due to ”˜t that captures both asset deterioration and obsolescence e ects.
Using (4.2) we can calculate the expected equilibrium return on the leased asset,
E(rl) = (1≠E(”˜t))ctct≠lt ≠1, and the covariance between the return on the leased asset and
the return on the market portfolio, Cov(rl, rm) = ≠Cov(”˜t,rm)ctct≠lt . Using these results
(4.1) can now be written as:
(1≠ E(”˜t))ct
ct ≠ lt ≠ 1 = rf ≠
Cov(”˜t, rm)ct
(ct ≠ lt)Var(rm) [E(rm)≠ rf ] (4.3)
Solving (4.3) for the lease rate, lt, gives the equilibrium lease rate:
l
ú
t =
A
rf + E(”˜t)≠ amCov(”˜t, rm)
1 + rf
B
ct (4.4)
where am = E(rm)≠rfV ar(rm) is the market price of risk and (4.4) is the certainty equivalent
pricing formula for the rental rate. If the lease rate was lower than the equilibrium
rate, the investors could earn higher expected return by investing their funds into the
12
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market and would be exiting the leasing business. On the other hand, a return higher
than the equilibrium return would attract new entrants into leasing until the lease
rate was bid down to the equilibrium level. Notice that if the economic depreciation
of the asset is completely uncorrelated with the market return, Cov(”˜t, rm) = 0, then
the one period lease rate simply becomes lút =
rf ct+E(”˜t)ct
1+rf . In other words, the one
period equilibrium lease rate is the present value of the opportunity cost of capital
and expected depreciation.
If the rate of depreciation was positively correlated with the market return, Cov(”˜t, rm) >
0, it would result in a lower equilibrium rental rate. This could happen e.g. if higher
economical activity would encourage more innovation increasing the speed at which
technology becomes obsolete, or if a lower level of economical activity was to decrease
the utilization of the leased assets lowering the wear and tear, and consequently the
rate of deterioration. A positively correlated rate of depreciation would then make
the lessors willing to accept lower rate of rental because o ering leases could lower
their overall risk exposure. On the other hand, if harder economical times were
to result in faster technological progress due to more fierce competition increasing
the likelihood of obsolescence, or if diminished returns would make lessees neglect
maintenance of equipment so that Cov(”˜t, rm) < 0, the lessor’s would require higher
lease rate’s to compensate for the increased systematic risk.
4.2 Lessee’s analysis
In a world adhering to the assumptions of the CAPM the value of a firm is the
present value of its cash flow (Hite, 1979, p. 165), that is1
Vd =
f(k) + (1≠ E(”˜t) + amCov(”˜t, rm))kb
1 + rf
≠ (ltkl + kb),
1The return on the lessee s uncertain cash flow at the end of period is f(k)+(1≠”˜t)kbVd , where Vd is
the present value of the end of period cash flow. Using the CAPM (4.1) gives f(k)+(1≠E(”˜t))kbVd =
rf ≠ kbV1
Cov(”˜t,rm)
V ar(rm) [E(rm)≠ rf ]. Solving the equation for Vd gives us the risk adjusted present
value for the end of period cash flow, Vd = f(k)+(1≠E(”˜t)+amCov(”˜,rm))kb1+rf , where am =
E(rm)≠rf
V ar(rm)
is the market price for risk.
13
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where f(k)1+rf is the present value of the service flow from capital k,
(1≠E(”˜t)+amCov(”˜t,rm))kb
1+rf
is the risk adjusted present value of the depreciated capital, and ltkl+kb is the total
payment made at the beginning of the period for the capital leased and bought.
The lessee will then select the amount of capital to lease and to buy so that the
value of the firm is maximized while the lessors charge the equilibrium lease rate lút .
When the lease rate is at equilibrium, the lessee s value becomes
V úd =
f(k) +
1
1≠ E(”˜t) + amCov(”˜t, rm)
2
(kl + kb)
1 + rf
≠ (kl + kb)
=
f(k) +
1
1≠ E(”˜t) + amCov(”˜t, rm)
2
k
1 + rf
≠ k
Hence the lessee’s value depends again only on the total amount of capital employed
and including uncertainty on the future cost of capital, ct+1, and the rate at which
the capital deteriorates, ”t, does not impact the conclusions about the irrelevance of
the financing decision under the assumptions of the CAPM.
Miller and Upton (1976, pp. 767 - 772) reach a similar conclusion also using the
Sharpe–Lintner CAPM model, but with a somewhat di erent approach. Smith
(1979, pp. 104-106) employs the Black–Scholes option pricing framework to charac-
terize leasing. Smith’s analysis is based on the observation that a collateralized loan
contract is equivalent to selling the collateralized asset to the lender for a bundle
containing the proceeds from the loan, a lease giving the control to the asset and a
call option to repurchase the asset with a strike price equal to the loan repayment
and accrued interest at the end of the period. That is
V = D + L+ C (4.5)
where V is the value of the collateral, D is the proceeds from the loan, i.e. the
funds the debtor receives at the beginning of the loan period by promising to repay
amount X at the end of the loan period, L is is the value of the lease and C is
the value of the call to repurchase the asset at price X at the end of the loan
period. Assuming that there are no costs, fees or penalties for the repossession of
the collateral, the expected value of the repayment of the loan at the end of the loan
14
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period is
´ X
0 VTg(VT )dVT +
´Œ
X Xg(VT )dVT , where VT is the value of the depreciated
capital at the end of the loan period at time T and g(VT ) is the probability density
function of the value of the depreciated capital at the end of the loan period at
time T . Hence the funds a risk neutral creditor would be willing to lend against the
collateralized loan contract at the beginning of the loan period
D = e≠rT
Qca Xˆ
0
VTg(VT )dVT +
Œˆ
X
Xg(VT )dVT
Rdb (4.6)
where r is the risk free interest rate. The value of a call option with strike X at
the terminal date T of the contract is the maximum of either the di erence of the
underlying asset and the exercise price, VT≠X, or zero and for a risk neutral investor
the value of the call at the beginning of the contract period is
C = e≠rT
Œˆ
X
(VT ≠X) g(VT )dVT (4.7)
Solving (4.5) for L and using (4.6) and (4.7) gives
L = V ≠ e≠rT
Qca Xˆ
0
VTg(VT )dVT +
Œˆ
X
Xg(VT )dVT
Rdb≠ e≠rT Œˆ
X
(VT ≠X) g(VT )dVT
= V ≠ e≠rT
Œˆ
0
VTg(VT )dVT (4.8)
Thus the value of a lease for the lessee equals the value of the asset minus a claim
on the value of the asset after time T , that is also the cost of owning the asset.
Therefore L is also the maximum price a lessee would be willing to pay for the lease
contract. If the price of the lease was higher than L, the lessee would always be
better o  buying the asset.
From the lessor’s point of view, all the cash flows of a lease contract are equal, but
of opposite sign and therefore (4.8) also holds for the lessor. For the lessor, L is
the minimum price at which he would be willing to o er the lease contract, because
otherwise the lease payment would not cover the expected change in the asset value.
Since L is the maximum price a rational lessee would be willing to pay for a lease
and also the minimum price at which a rational lessor would be o ering a lease,
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(4.8) also gives the equilibrium lease payment and hence in equilibrium the lessee is
indi erent between leasing and owning the asset.
By now, this result is hardly surprising and just confirms the conclusion reached
earlier using the Sharpe–Lintner CAPM framework. The option pricing framework
can be also used to value more complex lease contracts with options to e.g. extend
the lease or buy the object at the end of the contract as in Grenadier (1995) and
Bellalah (2002).
Assuming that the asset value at time T , VT , follows log-normal distribution value
of the lease becomes
L = V
1
1≠ e≠(r+”)T
2
(4.9)
where ” is the average expected rate of decrease in asset value, E (Vt/V ) = e≠”T
.2 From (4.9) it is easy to see that the greater the risk free interest rate, r, and
the expected rate of depreciation, ”, the higher the equilibrium price of a lease
is. This is obvious as the higher the interest rate, the higher the lease payments
needed to compensate for the increased opportunity cost of investing into capital
are. On the other hand the higher the expected rate of depreciation the smaller the
expected value of the asset at time T is and the higher the lease payment needed to
compensate for the loss of the value of the asset are.
2If g (x) is log normal density function with
z =
Y_]_[
0, if x > „y
⁄x≠ “y, if „y Ø x Ø Ây
0, if x < Ây
Then
E(z) =
„yˆ
Ây
(⁄x≠ “y) g(x)dx
= eﬂT⁄x0
5
N
; ln(x0/Ây) + (ﬂ+ ‡2/2)T
‡
Ô
T
<
≠N
; ln(x0/„y) + (ﬂ+ ‡2/2)T
‡
Ô
T
<6
≠ “y
5
N
; ln(x0/Ây) + (ﬂ≠ ‡2/2)T
‡
Ô
T
<
≠N
; ln(x0/„y) + (ﬂ≠ ‡2/2)T
‡
Ô
T
<6
where Â, „, ⁄ and “ are arbitrary parameters and ﬂ is the average expected rate of growth in
x (E(x/x0) = eﬂT ) and N {·}is the cumulative standard normal function. (Smith and Wakeman,
1985, p. 83)
The result follows by applying the solution with Â = 0, „ =Œ, ⁄ = e≠rT , “ = 0 and ﬂ = ≠”
.
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about the future
As presented in the previous chapter, in frictionless markets a value maximizing firm
is indi erent between leasing and buying its capital as predicted by the Modigliani–
Miller theorem. The assumptions under which the CAPM applies are, however,
rather restrictive and in the following section we analyze leasing under more general
expected utility maximizing framework. The analysis presented is closely related to
the optimal contracting analysis of Wolfson (1985) and Leland (1978) and is based
on the frameworks presented by Brick and Jagpal (1984) in the context of quality
decision under uncertainty and Leland (1980) in the context of optimal portfolio
insurance.
Let us assume that the leasing market behaves as if it was composed of representative
or “average” lessors whose expected utility of future profits is:
Wc = Ec
I
Uc
CA
lt ≠ ct + (1≠
˜”t)ct
1 + rt
B
kl
DJ
(5.1)
where Uc denotes lessor’s utility and Pc =
3
lt ≠ ct + (1≠ ˜”t)ct1+rt
4
kl is the present value
of lessor’s profit. The leasing market is still assumed perfectly competitive and in
equilibrium the lessors are not expected to make any profit:
W úc = Ec
I
Uc
CA
lút ≠ ct +
(1≠ ˜”t)ct
1 + rt
B
kl
DJ
= Uc(0)
where Uc(0) denotes to the lessor’s utility when he is not participating to the leasing
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market.
An expected utility maximizing lessee is then selecting the amount of capital k to
employ and deciding the share of capital to lease and the share to buy in order to
maximize the utility of his future profits:
Wd = Ed
I
Ud
C
f(k) + (1≠ ”˜t)ct(1≠ „)k
1 + rt
≠ lt„k ≠ ct(1≠ „)k
DJ
(5.2)
where „ denotes to the share of leased capital, so that kl = „k and kb = (1 ≠ „)k.
Pd = f(k)+(1≠”˜t)ct(1≠„)k1+rt ≠lt„k≠ct(1≠„)k is the present value of lessee’s random profit,
where f(k) is the value of the future production, (1≠ ”˜t)ct(1≠ „)k, is the uncertain
future value of the depreciated asset, l„k is the lease payment, and ct(1≠„)k is the
cost of owned capital. Hence the lessee’s maximization problem is
max
k,„
Wd = Ed
I
Ud
C
f(k) + (1≠ ”˜t)ct(1≠ „)k
1 + rt
≠ lt„k ≠ ct(1≠ „)k
DJ
s.t. Ec
I
Uc
CA
lút ≠ ct +
(1≠ ˜”t)ct
1 + rt
B
„k
DJ
≠ Uc(0) = 0
The Lagrangian for the problem is
L =
Œˆ
≠Œ
Ud
C
f(k) + (1≠ ”˜t)ct(1≠ „)k
1 + rt
≠ lt„k ≠ ct(1≠ „)k
D
gd(”˜)d”˜
+ ⁄
Œˆ
≠Œ
Uc
CA
lút ≠ ct +
(1≠ ˜”t)ct
1 + rt
B
„k
D
gc(”˜)d”˜ ≠ Uc(0) (5.3)
where ⁄ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the equilibrium rental rate constraint, and
gd(”˜) and gc(”˜) are the lessee’s and lessor’s subjective probability density functions
of economic depreciation ”˜. Solving the Euler–Lagrange di erential equation for the
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maximization problem (5.3) gives
U dgd(”˜)≠ ⁄U c gc(”˜) = 0 (5.4)
where U d = ˆUd/ˆpd and U c = ˆUc/ˆpc. Di erentiating equation (5.4) with respect to
”˜ gives
U  d
ct(1≠ „)k
1 + rt
gd(”˜)≠ U  d g d(”˜)≠ ⁄
A
U  c
ct„k
1 + rt
gc(”˜)≠ U  c g c (”˜)
B
= 0 (5.5)
where U  d = ˆ2Ud/ˆp2d, U  c = ˆ2Uc/ˆp2c, g d(”˜) = ˆgd(”˜)/ˆ”˜.and g c (”˜) = ˆgc(”˜)/ˆ”˜. We can
now solve equation (5.5) for ⁄ and using the result in (5.4) we obtain
U dgd(”˜)≠
U  d
ct(1≠„)k
1+rt gd(”˜)≠ U  d g d(”˜)
U  c
ct„k
1+rt gc(”˜)≠ U  c g c (”˜)
U c gc(”˜) = 0 (5.6)
Solving (5.6) for „ gives
„ =
g d(”˜)/gd(”˜)≠ g c (”˜)/gc(”˜) + ARAd ctk1+rt
(ARAc + ARAd) ctk1+rt
(5.7)
where ≠U  c /U c = ARAc and ≠U  d /U d = ARAd are the Arrow–Pratt measures of
absolute risk-aversion for the lessor and lessee respectively.
Let us first consider a case where the lessor and lessee have identical subjective
expectations about the future economic depreciation, gd(”˜) = gc(”˜), so that „ =
ARAd
ARAc+ARAd =
Ë
1 + ARAcARAd
È≠1
. There are two special cases of particular interest. The
first case is when the lessor is risk neutral, ARAc = 0, and the lessee is risk averse,
ARAd > 0, then „ = 1 and the lessor uses leasing for 100% the capital employed.
On the other hand if the lessor is risk averse, ARAc > 0, and the lessee is risk
neutral, ARAd = 0, then „ = 0 and only owned capital is employed. Between these
two extremes there is a continuum of possible financing arrangements where the
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more risk averse the lessor is relative to the lessee, the higher is the share of capital
leased.
The lessee and the lessor can also have di ering expectations about the future eco-
nomic depreciation. Let us assume that the future economic depreciation is log-
normally distributed with Ec(ln ”˜) = µc, Ed(ln ”˜) = µd and V arc(ln ”˜) = V ard(ln ”˜) =
‡2. That is, the lessor and the lessee have identical estimates of the variance of the
depreciation, but their subjective estimates of the mean of the depreciation di er.
The log-normality assumption implies that the lessor’s probability density function
gd(”˜) = 1”˜Ô2ﬁ‡2 exp
C
≠(ln ”˜≠µd)
2
2‡2
D
and hence g d(”˜)/gd(”˜) = ≠
1
1 + ln ”˜≠µd‡2
2
”˜≠1. Using
(5.7) we get
„ =
µd≠µc
‡2” + ARAd
ctk
1+rt
(ARAc + ARAd) ctk1+rt
(5.8)
When the lessee’s estimate of the mean of the economic depreciation is higher than
the lessor’s estimate, µd > µc, the lessee is leasing a higher share of the capital than
when the lessor and the lessee have identical expectations. The more pessimistic
the lessee is about the future value of the depreciated capital, the higher the share
of leasing is on any given level of risk tolerance behavior of the lessor and the lessee.
Hence leasing o ers a way to share the risk of uncertain future value of the asset
inherent to owning the capital as also presented by Wolfson (1985). In Chapter
4 we, however, concluded that under the assumptions of the CAPM the financing
decision is irrelevant and all risk averse agents should be indi erent between leasing
and buying. This raises the question as to why a utility maximizing risk adverse
agent would strictly prefer leasing to buying as shown above.
The explanation for this lies in the assumptions made when applying the CAPM
model. In the theory of firm in a perfect capital market setting, there is no need to
introduce a firm utility function. In the context of the CAPM the objective of the
firm is to maximize its risk adjusted value that is determined by the markets and
it is the role of investors to decide on the shares of various assets in their portfolios
so that their utility is maximized (see e.g. Hite, 1979). Fama (1980) has shown that
in a frictionless world where information is symmetric and the market for human
capital is competitive, a manager maximizing the expected utility of his wealth will
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choose policies which maximize the value of the company. When the labor market
is perfectly competitive, the value of human capital in terms of future wages equals
the marginal productivity of the labor input to the owners of the firm. Hence the
objectives of the firm’s owners and managers are aligned despite the separation of
ownership and control of the decisions.
Instead, if the information about the management performance is asymmetric, it is
possible for the manager to maximize his own utility at the expense of the owner’s
of the firm. This can occur when e.g. some type of return on capital type metric is
used to determine management’s compensation. Then the management may have
an incentive to minimize the risk on near term cash flow as well as the value of the
assets, and use leasing even if the cost of lease would be higher than the expected cost
of ownership. Furthermore, if the lessee’s access to riskless borrowing is restricted
and the assumptions about assets divisibility and liquidity are violated so that the
lessee’s possibilities to diversify across a range of investments are also limited, a
utility maximizing risk averse agent is not necessarily value maximizing. This is
intuitive when the lessee is a consumer, e.g. an individual needing housing. A house
or an apartment cannot typically be bought in divisible quantities and the access to
mortgage is typically limited by the collateral value of the house. The disconnect
between value maximizing and utility maximizing behavior is not, however, limited
to the consumer, but may also be applicable in the case of a firm e.g. when the access
to risk free borrowing is limited or when the assumption of no taxes is violated.
These cases are analyzed more in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
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One of the key assumptions behind the indi erence proposition between leasing and
buying is tax neutrality, i.e. all users of capital face the same tax rate. In this section
we discuss the incentives for leasing created by the possibility for tax arbitrage.
The valuation model discussed was originally introduced by Stewart C. Myers and
Bautista (1976), who present a rigorous analytical derivation of the model. The
approach presented here, however, follows a more intuitive presentation of Franks
and Hodges (1978).
6.1 Lessee’s analysis
Consider first the cash flow resulting from a financial lease contract for capital k
covering n periods. The cost of leasing is lt per unit of capital per period, the lessor
makes the lease payments ltk at the beginning of each period t œ (1, n) and there
are no further payments to be made when the lease contract expires at the end of
period n . The lease payments can be deducted from the lessor’s taxable income
and the net payment after taxes is ltk(1≠ ·d) , where ·d is the lessor’s marginal tax
rate. The resulting cash flows are illustrated in Figure 6.1 on page 24.
As an alternative to leasing, capital also can be purchased at the price of one per
unit at the beginning of the first period, c1 = 1 . The cost of purchase is activated
to the balance sheet at the time of purchase and the capital investment gives the
agent right to depreciation tax shields dtk·d, where dt is the tax depreciation per
unit of capital deductible at the beginning of every period t œ (1, n)1. The salvage
value of the capital k at the end of period n is now assumed to be zero. The cash
flow from buying the capital is depicted in Figure 6.2 on page 25.
1We assume that the depreciation tax shields are taken into account when advance taxes are
determined
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Figure 6.1: Time profile: After tax lease payments.
In order to finance the purchase, the firm borrows 100% of the funds needed and
makes corresponding payments for the interest and principal. The interest payments
are made from the profits before taxes so that the e ective interest rate is rÕd =
r(1≠ ·d) , where r is the interest rate at which the firm can borrow. The cash flow
from borrowing and making the corresponding repayments is shown in Figure 6.3
on page 26.
The payments to service the debt are made at the beginning of each period t œ (2, n).
By selecting an appropriate repayment schedule, the combined net cash flow of
servicing the debt and the depreciation tax shields can be made equal to the cash
flow of the financial lease agreement in periods 2 to n as illustrated in Figure 6.4 on
page 27. That is, we set the loan repayment schedule so that bt≠dtk·d = ltk (1≠ ·d).
Solving for bt, which is the after tax loan repayment and interest at time t, gives
bt = ltk (1≠ ·d) + dtk·d for all t > 1.
Let Bt stand for the amount of debt outstanding at time t after servicing the debt.
Then for each period t, Bt = Bt≠1+ rdBt≠1≠ (bt + rdBt≠1·d), where Bt≠1 is the loan
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Figure 6.2: Time profile: cash flows for purchase.
principal carried over from the previous period, rdBt≠1 is the interest accrued from
period t≠1 to period t, and bt+ rdBt≠1·d is the repayment and interest before taxes
to service the debt at time t. Solving for Bt≠1 gives
Bt≠1 =
Bt + bt
1 + (1≠ ·d) rd =
Bt + bt
1 + rÕd
, (6.1)
Hence the value of the loan at time t≠ 1 is equal to the present value of the time t
loan principal before repayment discounted using the lessee’s e ective interest rate
rÕd. The debt matures at period n when the final debt repayment bn is made, Bn = 0,
and hence Bn≠1 = bn1+rÕd , Bn≠2 =
Bn≠1+bn≠1
1+rÕd
= bn(1+rÕd)2
+ bn≠11+rÕd and Bn≠3 =
Bn≠2+bn≠2
1+rÕd
=
bn
(1+rÕd)3
+ bn≠1(1+rÕd)2
+ bn≠21+rÕd . Following the same logic and applying (6.1) successively
gives the value of the initial debt
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Figure 6.3: Time profile: Borrowing and repayment
B1 =
nÿ
t=2
bt
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1 =
nÿ
t=2
lt (1≠ ·d) + dt·d
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1 k
where the first equality simply states that the initial loan principal is equal to the
present value the future net loan repayments discounted using the lessor’s e ective
tax rate rÕd. The second equality follows from our requirement that the loan repay-
ment schedule is set so that net loan repayments are equal to the net cost of leasing
for periods t œ (2, n).
From the lessee’s perspective the obligation of the lease payments is similar to the
obligation of the loan repayment and the interest. We also assume that if the
company is in tax paying position at time t, it can fully utilize the tax shields
from either interest payments or lease payments. Therefore, the agent is indi erent
between making the after tax lease payments or the payments servicing the debt
net of the tax depreciation and interest tax savings all t > 1 . Consequently the
di erences between leasing and buying are fully captured in the cash flow at the
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Figure 6.4: Time profile: Net cash flow of purchase with borrowing.
beginning of the first period at time t = 1.
When the agent buys the equipment, the net cash flow at the first period is B1≠k+
d1k·d, i.e. he receives the borrowed funds, pays for the equipment and receives the
tax shield from the first period depreciation. For an agent leasing the equipment the
first period cash flow is just the first period after tax lease payment l1k (1≠ ·d). The
agent should select leasing over buying the capital when the first period cash outflow
of buying exceeds the first period cash flow of leasing, that is when k≠B1≠d1k·d >
l1k (1≠ ·d) … k ≠ qnt=1 lt(1≠·d)+dt·d(1+rÕd)t≠1 k > 0. Dividing this result by k gives us the
value of leasing contract per unit of capital leased
vd = 1≠
nÿ
t=1
lt (1≠ ·d) + dt·dl
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1 (6.2)
Hence the value of leasing to the lessee, vd, is the net present value of the purchase
price minus the after tax lease payments and the forgone depreciation tax shields
discounted at the e ective after tax interest rate.
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• Example 6.1. Consider a lease agreement for an asset costing one thousand
euros, k = 1000Ä. A firm can lease the asset for ten periods, n = 10, with a
lease rate lt = 0, 135Ä. Alternatively the firm can buy the asset and finance
the investment with a loan. The interest rate for the loan, rd = 8% and the
firm’s marginal tax rate ·d = 30% for the duration of the lease agreement.
The allowed maximum depreciation for tax purposes is uniform depreciation
in 10 periods, dt = 0, 1. The cash flows in each of the options are presented
in Table 6.1 on page 38. Applying (6.2) gives that the net value vdk of the
lease agreement for the lessor is 13,75 euros and thus the firm is better o  by
leasing rather than by taking a loan and buying the asset.
6.2 Lessor’s analysis
Now consider the lease contract from the lessor’s perspective. The contract provides
the lessor after tax lease payments ltk (1≠ ·c) for all t œ (1, n). In order to sign
the lease contract the lessor first needs to buy capital k that entitles him to receive
the associated depreciation tax shields dtk·c. The purchase of the capital k can
be financed with a loan where the repayment and the net interest payment bt =
ltk (1≠ ·c) + dtk·c so that the net cash flow is zero for all t Ø 2. Therefore, in an
analogous way to the lessee’s analysis, the value of the lease contract is completely
captured in the cash flows at the beginning of the lease period at time t = 1. The
initial value of the lessor’s debt is qnt=2 bt(1+rÕc)t≠1 = qnt=2 lt(1≠·c)+dt·c(1+rÕc)t≠1 k, the purchase
cost of capital is k, the first period after tax lease payment is l1k (1≠ ·c) and the
first period depreciation tax shield is d1k·c. The value of the lease contract per unit
of capital leased for the lessor is then
vc =
A
nÿ
t=2
lt (1≠ ·c) + dt·c
(1 + rÕc)
t≠1 k ≠ k + l1k (1≠ ·c) + d1k·c
B
k≠1
=
nÿ
t=1
lt (1≠ ·c) + dt·c
(1 + rÕc)
t≠1 ≠ 1 (6.3)
where rÕc = rc (1≠ ·c) is the e ective interest rate of the lessor. After going through
the lessee’s analysis, this result is obvious considering that the cash flows of the
lessor are the same as those of the lessee but with opposite signs.
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6.3 Net gain to leasing
The lease contract can only take place if the value of the contract is positive for
both the lessor and the lessee.
• Example 6.2. Consider again Example 6.1, but now the lessee’s tax rate ·d = 0.
The lessor’s tax rate ·c = 30% and other parameters are as in Example 6.1
(k = 1000Ä, n = 10, lt = 0, 135, dt = 0, 1 and rc = rd = r = 8%). Using (6.2)
we get that the lessee’s value of the contract has now increased to 21, 67Ä as
the opportunity cost of tax shields lost has decreased. However, according
to (6.3) the lessor’s value for the contract is negative, ≠13, 75Ä, and a profit
maximizing lessor would not be willing to o er a lease contract on these terms.
However, if the lease payment is increased to 137, 5Ä the lessee’s value for the
contract would drop to 3, 55Ä while the lessor’s value for the contract would
become marginally profitable, 0, 11Ä, and there would be a positive net gain
of 3, 66Ä for the contract. The time profile of the cash flows for the lessee and
the lessor when the lease payment ltk = 137, 5Ä are shown in Table 6.2 on
page 39.
The total value of the contract per unit of capital leased is
v = vd + vc
=
nÿ
t=1
C
lt (1≠ ·c) + dt·c
(1 + rÕc)t≠1
≠ lt (1≠ ·d) + dt·d
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1
D
(6.4)
where the tax depreciation rate dt and the lease rate lt are obviously the same for
both parties of the contract. If both the lessor and the lessee are also facing the
same interest rate r, it is easy to see that when ·c = ·d, the total value of the lease
contract is zero as the Modigliani–Miller theorem predicts.
The lessee’s value for the contract can be also written as
vd = 1≠ PV {lt(1≠ ·d)}≠ PV {dt·d}≠ PV {r·dBd,t} , (6.5)
where PV {} refers to the present value of the cash flow indicated in the brackets
(Stewart C. Myers and Bautista, 1976, p. 801). The first two terms on the right
hand side reflect the di erence in the after tax cash flows of buying and making
the lease payments. The third term reflects the depreciation tax shields and the
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last term the interest tax shields lost by the lessee. In general, when there are
di erences in the risk characteristics of the cash flows, each one of the cash flows
should be discounted using their appropriate risk adjusted interest rates (Samis
et al., 2005, Schall, 1974) as was done in Chapter 4. However, the assumption that
all the cash flows can be discounted using the same interest rate, r, serves as a first
approximation and while deriving (6.2) and (6.3) we implicitly made an assumption
that the di erent cash flows fall into same risk class and therefore can be discounted
using the same interest rate r. Holding this assumption, we can write (6.5) as vd =
1≠qnt=1 lt(1≠·d)(1+r)t≠1 ≠qnt=1 dt·d(1+r)t≠1 ≠qnt=1 r·dBd,t≠1(1+r)t≠1 . The lessor’s analysis is similar but
with opposite signs. Assuming that the lessor is facing the same marginal borrowing
rate r as the lessee, we can write vc =
qn
t=1
lt(1≠·c)
(1+r)t≠1 +
qn
t=1
dt·c
(1+r)t≠1 +
qn
t=1
r·cBc,t≠1
(1+r)t≠1 ≠1.
The net gain to leasing per unit of capital can be now written as
v =
nÿ
t=1
dt(·c ≠ ·d)
(1 + r)t≠1 +
nÿ
t=1
r(·cBc,t≠1 ≠ ·dBd,t≠1)
(1 + r)t≠1 ≠
nÿ
t=1
lt(·c ≠ ·d)
(1 + r)t≠1 . (6.6)
where the first term on the right hand side is the present value of the net tax
depreciation, the second term is the present value of the net interest tax shields and
the last term is the present value of the net after tax lease payments. Hence the net
gain to leasing is the present value of the di erence in the tax shields and the value
originates from the depreciation schedule allowed for tax purposes and the schedule
for lease payments. When the tax depreciation is accelerated, i.e. the rate of tax
depreciation exceeds the rate of economic depreciation, the firm can acquire interest
free tax debt (Kanniainen and Södersten, 1994). Now the economic depreciation is
not explicit in (6.6). Instead it is implicit in lt as shown in the tax free case in (3.2).
Clearly, the higher the firm’s marginal tax rate, the higher the value of the interest
free tax debt is. Therefore, if the lessee has lower marginal tax rate than the lessor,
the value of the total tax shields is greater, when the lessor has the title to the asset
giving it the right to the depreciation tax shields.
Another source of net value lies in the schedule of lease payments. In Section 3.3 we
concluded that in neoclassical world all lease payment schedules that have the same
net present value would be equally preferred by lessors and lessees. Introducing
taxes does not change anything fundamental here, and lessors and lessees are still
indi erent between any cash flow schedules that provide the same present value and
fall in the same risk class. Particularly consider two streams of lease payments with
same present value but di erent payment schedules. Assuming that both the lessor
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and the lessee are facing the same market interest rate r the net value of the before
tax cash flows are obviously zero in both cases. The value of the after tax lease
payment cash flows are, however, di erent when their marginal tax rates di er. The
lessee can deduct the lease payments from his taxable income and hence delaying the
lease payments is a loss in present value for the lessee. On the other hand postponing
the lease payments results in deferral of taxes for the lessor, that increases the present
value of the after tax lease payments. When the lessor’s marginal tax rate is higher
than the marginal tax rate of the lessee, the gain for the lessor is greater than the loss
for the lessee and the net present value of deferring the lease payments is positive.
These two mechanisms of tax deferral; interest free tax debt due to accelerated tax
depreciation and deferral of the taxable income, o er a vehicle for tax arbitrage
where the user of the capital sells the rights to the depreciation tax shields and
interest tax savings to the financier. The gain that the lessor and lessee capture is
naturally a loss to the government (Stewart C. Myers and Bautista, 1976, p. 813).
Now that we have concluded that cash flows taxed at di ering tax rates can create
net value to leasing, a question about the impact of interest and tax rates on the value
is of natural interest. In order to answer this question and derive some comparative
statics we assume a uniform lease rate, lt = l, and di erentiate (6.4) with respect to
the lease rate l giving :
ˆv
ˆl
= ˆ
ˆl
nÿ
t=1
C
l (1≠ ·c) + dt·c
(1 + rÕc)t≠1
≠ l (1≠ ·d) + dt·d
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1
D
=
nÿ
t=1
C
(1≠ ·c)
(1 + rÕc)t≠1
≠ (1≠ ·d)
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1
D
= (1≠ ·c)(1 + r
Õ
c)≠ (1 + rÕc)1≠n
rÕc
≠ (1≠ ·d)(1 + r
Õ
d)≠ (1 + rÕd)1≠n
rÕd
= ·d ≠ ·c + 1
r
Ë
(1 + rÕd)1≠n ≠ (1 + rÕc)1≠n
È
< 0, when ·d < ·c
where the second equality follows from the properties of geometric series and re-
membering that rÕ = (1≠ ·)r. Thus the overall value of the lease contract increases
as the lease rate decreases and is maximized when the lessor captures all the value.
This is intuitive considering that the total value of the contract is derived from the
deferral of the taxes and the lower the lease rate the lower the net tax burden on the
lease payments. How the value of the lease contract is actually divided between the
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lessor and lessee depends on the relative supply of taxable earnings to the supply
of excess tax deductions. Assuming competitive and frictionless markets where the
supply of excess tax deductions exceeds the supply of taxable earnings all the value
of the tax arbitrage is captured by the tax paying lessor companies. Similarly when
the supply of taxable earnings is greater than the supply of excess tax deductions
the value of the leasing contracts is captured by the non-taxpaying lessees (Franks
and Hodges, 1987).
The net gain to leasing is greater the more accelerated the depreciation tax shields
are as illustrated in (6.5) where declining balance depreciation schedules with dif-
ferent rates of depreciation ﬂ are compared to a straight line depreciation. This is
intuitive considering that the net gain to leasing is due to net deferral of taxes taking
place when the tax depreciation and interest tax shields are accelerated compared
to the taxes paid on the lease payments.
The most simple case of accelerated tax depreciation is straight line depreciation,
dt = d, and uniform lease rate, lt = l. Using (6.3) we can calculate the lessor’s value
with straight line depreciation and uniform lease rate:
vc = [l (1≠ ·c) + d·c]
nÿ
t=1
1
(1 + rÕc)
t≠1 ≠ 1
= [l (1≠ ·c) + d·c] 1 + r
Õ
c ≠ (1 + rÕc)1≠n
rÕc
≠ 1 (6.7)
where the second equality follows from the properties of geometric series. Let us
then assume that most of the companies are in tax paying position so that the
supply of excess tax deductions is scarce and hence the lessee captures all the value
(vc = 0). Using (6.7) we then get the equilibrium lease rate with taxes:
lú = r (1 + r
Õ
c)n≠1
(1 + rÕc)n ≠ 1
≠ d ·c1≠ ·c (6.8)
Notice that when ·c = 0, lú = r (1+r)
n≠1
(1+r)n≠1 , that is exactly the same result we got in
the case of uniform equilibrium lease rate without taxes on page 9.
Using (6.2) and (6.8) we get the net gain to leasing per unit of capital with straight
line depreciation and uniform lease rate when the lessee captures all the value:
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Figure 6.5: Impact of the allowed tax depreciation schedule on the net gain of
leasing. The asset is depreciated in ten years (n = 10) with full write-o  of the
remaining balance of the asset value at the end of the period and it is assumed
that the lessor captures full value of the lease.
v = 1≠ [lú (1≠ ·d) + d·d]
nÿ
t=1
C
1
(1 + rÕd)
t≠1
D
= 1≠
A
1 + rÕc
1 + rÕd
Bn≠1 (1 + rÕd)n ≠ 1
(1 + rÕc)n ≠ 1
+ ·c ≠ ·d1≠ ·c
(1 + rÕd)n ≠ 1
rÕd (1 + rÕd)
n≠1d (6.9)
With moderate interest rates (r / 15% ) the net gain is increasing in r with all
marginal tax rates ·c (Figure 6.6 on page 34). However when the interest rate
increases further the net gain of leasing starts to decrease and with high interest
rates (r ' 30% ) the net gain becomes negative. This is because with moderate
interest rates higher interest rates increase the value of tax deferral gained through
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leasing. When the interest rates increase further the opportunity cost of capital and
the value of the interest tax shields increase faster than the gain from tax deferral
making leasing less attractive.
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Figure 6.6: Net gain of leasing per euro leased with uniform lease rate (lt = l)
and straight line depreciation with zero salvage value (dt = 1/n) when the lessee
captures all the value and has zero marginal tax rate (vd = 0, ·d = 0).
Di erentiating (6.8) with respect to ·c gives:
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ˆlú
ˆ·c
= ≠r2
Y][(n≠ 1) (1 + rÕc)
n≠2
(1 + rÕc)n ≠ 1
≠ n (1 + r
Õ
c)2(n≠1)
[(1 + rÕc)n ≠ 1]2
Z^
\≠ d(1≠ ·c)2
= r2 (1 + r
Õ
c)2(n≠1) + (n≠ 1) (1 + rÕc)n≠2
[(1 + rÕc)n ≠ 1]2
≠ d
(1≠ ·c)2
that is negative when r is small relative to d. Hence when interest rates are low
compared to the rate of depreciation the equilibrium lease rate is decreasing in
lessor’s marginal tax rate ·c . Lower lease rates in turn increase the lessee’s gain
from leasing as also shown in Figure 6.6 on page 34. This is not only the case when
the lessee’s marginal tax rate is zero, but the net gain to leasing is increasing in the
di erence in marginal tax rates between the lessor and lessee (when the interest rates
are moderate) as shown in Figure 6.7. Notice also that the value of a lease contract
is positive only when the lessor’s marginal tax rate is grater than the marginal tax
rate of the lessee (·c > ·d).
6.4 Model limitations
When deriving the value of the lease contract all the cash flows have been assumed
to be certain, that is not, however, always the case with the tax shields. The profits
may not always exceed the interest payments and the tax benefits may be canceled
in the future. The company may be also forced to reduce it’s debt as a consequence
of a reduction in it’s debt capacity reducing the value of the tax breaks. Therefore
in reality the size of the benefit is uncertain.
Another limitation in the model of Franks and Hodges (1978) presented above is,
that it is assumed that the lessor and the lessee would operate on 100% debt finance.
This is not a very realistic assumption and even the companies with the best credit
ratings are usually required to finance part of their investments with internal funds.
Stewart C. Myers and Bautista (1976) introduce ⁄, a debt displacement factor, in
order to take into account debt constraints. If ⁄ = 1, then one euro of capital leased
displaces one euro of debt. Assume then that a lessor is financing a fraction ⁄ of the
purchase of the equipment with debt. Then the e ective interest rate rÕ = r(1≠⁄·),
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Figure 6.7: Net gain of leasing per euro leased with uniform lease rate (lt = l)
and straight line depreciation with zero salvage value (dt = 1/n) when the lessee
captures all the value and has zero marginal tax rate (vd = 0, ·d = 0, r = 5%).
as only part of the interest on the investment creates tax shields2
Qualitatively the impact of smaller debt displacement factor ⁄ is then similar to a
lower tax rate. Assuming that the lessor and the lessee are facing the same debt
displacement factor, decreasing ⁄ has the same impact as decreasing the di erence in
marginal tax rates. As presented in Section 6.3 the net gain to leasing is increasing
in the di erence in marginal tax rates, hence the higher the requirement for internal
funds, the smaller the net gain to leasing is. The impact of debt constraints is
2Consider an investment of y0 dollars, where a fraction ⁄ of the investment is financed with loan
and the rest with internal funds. The interest payment on the loan can be deducted from
the taxable income and the equity part carries an opportunity cost of r. The value of the
investment at the end of period 1 is then y1 = y0 + y0r ≠ ·r⁄y0 = (1 + r(1 ≠ ⁄·))y0 and the
e ective interest rate rÕ = r(1≠ ⁄T ).
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discussed more in detail in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.1: Lease vs. purchase analysis, lessee’s cash flow with ·d = 30%, k =
1000Ä, dt = 0, 1 and rd = 8%. Net value of the lease is 108, 25Ä≠96, 25Ä = 13, 75Ä.
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Table 6.2: The net gain to leasing with ·d = 0%, ·c = 30%, k = 1000Ä, dt = 0, 1
and r = 8%. Net value of the lease for the lessee is 156, 67Ä≠135Ä = 21, 67Ä, but
the lessor’s value for the contract is ≠13, 75Ä and hence a rational lessor would
not o er a lease contract on these terms.
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7 Imperfect Capital Markets
As stated in Chapter 1, the Modigliani–Miller framework assumes that there are
no transaction costs, information is symmetric and the companies can borrow any
quantities they need to finance their capital investment projects. In real world,
however, these assumptions are frequently violated. The purpose of this chapter is
to study the impact of the collateral requirements and information asymmetry on
why leasing may be the preferred method of financing capital investments.
7.1 Collateral requirements
In case of secured debt the value of the asset required as collateral usually exceeds the
value of the loan principal. This is because repossession of the collateralized assets
is costly and in order for the lender to secure his claims the value of the collateral
needs to cover both the loan principal and the repossession cost. Therefore 100%
financing is not possible, but the debtor is required to have internal funds to finance
part of the investment.
On the other hand when capital is leased the lessor retains ownership to the asset.
In case the lessee defaults on his obligations, the lessor has usually automatically
right to repossess the leased asset. As a result transaction costs due to repossession
are lower for a lessor than for a secured lender.
7.2 Separation of ownership and control
In financial lease contract the ownership and control of the asset is separated creating
a principal-agent problem. In general the principal-agent problems are characterized
by a moral hazard due to information asymmetry, where the actions of an individual
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cannot be observed or are costly to observe and hence cannot be contracted upon
(Holmström, 1979).
Now the moral hazard or incentive problem is created because the ownership and
control of the asset are separated. When the user of the asset does not have the
right to the asset’s residual value, the incentives for the lessee to take proper care of
the asset are less than when the same agent owns and uses the asset and thus bears
the full cost of abuse (Smith and Wakeman, 1985, Wolfson, 1985). The information
asymmetry arises when the lessor cannot directly observe the use of the asset and
therefore the lessor cannot contract to charge according to the real depreciation of
the asset. Consequently the lessee is more likely to be careless with the use of the
asset and neglect maintenance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
A rational lessor takes this into account and sets the lease payments so that they
provide a normal return taking into account the expected lower residual value of the
asset. This results in higher lease rates that in turn leads to the further problem
of adverse selection. The agents that expect light use the asset will find the lease
rates high compared to the purchase price and are more likely to buy the asset.
As a consequence the fraction of lessors abusing the asset increases. (Smith and
Wakeman, 1985).
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) present a valuation model addressing the trade-o s
between the benefits of allocating the ownership of the asset to the user minimizing
the agency problem, and allocating the ownership to the financier allowing extension
of the credit. The following analysis is largely based on Eisfeldt and Rampini’s
model, but here we adopt a simplified version of the market for borrowed funds. In
Eisfeldt and Rampini’s model borrowing is state contingent, but this is not relevant
for the study of relative benefits of leasing over equity finance and therefore it is
dropped from the discussion below.1
1In Eisfeldt and Rampini’s model state contingent borrowing means that by promising to pay
Rb(s) in state s at time 1, the agent can get funds ﬁ(s)b(s) at time 0 and the agent can
decide separately about the amounts b(L) and b(H). The e ective interest rate on loan against
state s is Rﬁ(s)≠1. The state contingency of loans can be interpreted to represent di erent
seniorities of claims or ex-post re-negotiations of loan contracts rendering borrowing e ectively
state contingent.
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7.3 Assumptions
7.3.1 Economy
The economy is defined as a two-period model, where there is a continuum of agents
(firms) who at time 0 make investment decisions to capital projects that generate
cash flow at time 1. The world at time 1 is uncertain and it can result in one of two
states, high (H) or low (L). The unconditional probability of state s at time 0 is ﬁ(s),
s œ (L,H). State s is characteristic to each agent and the agents cannot influence
these probabilities by their own actions. The realization of state s is assumed to be
agent’s private information, so that only the agent knows whether his state at time
1 is high or low.
7.3.2 Production Technology
The agents have access to same projects and to same production technology that
can be represented by a production function
f(k; a(s),–) = a(s)k–
where a(s) Ø 0 is a stochastic productivity that depends on state s, k is the capital
the agent invests at time 0 and – œ (0, 1) is a scaling parameter of the production
function. The price of goods produced is unity so that the cash flow generated at
time 1 is a(s)k–, where a(H) > a(L). The agents can buy and/or lease production
capital, and the bought (kb Ø 0) and leased (kl Ø 0) capital are perfect substitutes
in production, i.e. k = kb + kl . Notice that since – < 1, the production function
is concave in k, and the production technology has diminishing marginal return on
capital k.
7.3.3 Financing
Capital can be always bought and sold in any quantities at a price of c = 1 per
unit of capital. The purchases of the capital can be partially financed by borrowing
using the capital as collateral. The loans are provided by competitive, risk neutral
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and perfectly diversified financial intermediaries. As the loan market is perfectly
competitive the financial intermediaries make zero profits and since they are per-
fectly diversified they can always deliver on their promises. Therefore the financial
intermediaries need not to be considered explicitly in the model, but they can be
considered as banks financed by savings from agents that are running a surplus on
their internal funds.
When borrowing funds b at time 0 the agents must promise to pay amount Rb at
time 1, where R = (1 + r) is the gross interest rate determined in equilibrium. The
agents are restricted to be one of two types: borrowers (b Ø 0) or savers (b Æ 0).
The lenders require full collateral on the agent’s promises to pay, Rb. The lender
can repossess only a fraction ◊ of the value of the depreciated capital when it is
repossessed because there is a deadweight cost to repossession. The lender takes this
into account when determining the collateral requirements resulting in the following
collateral constraint:
Rb Æ ◊(1≠ ”)kb (7.1)
where ” œ (0, 1) is the rate of economical depreciation of the capital. Therefore the
maximum loan an agent can get at time 0 is b Æ R≠1◊(1 ≠ ”)kb and the minimum
internal funds needed for the purchase are 1 ≠ R≠1◊(1 ≠ ”) per unit of capital
purchased.
The repayment of the loan has to be made either from the cash flow from production
or with repossessed capital giving the following repayment constraint:
Rb Æ a(s)k– + ◊(1≠ ”)kr(s),’s œ S (7.2)
where kr(s) Ø 0 is the amount of capital repossessed in equilibrium in state s.
While the lender gets only a fraction ◊ of the value of the depreciated capital in
repossession, the debtor forfeits the full depreciated value of the repossessed capital.
A fraction (1 ≠ ◊) of the value is lost and can be interpreted as the cost of the
repossession activities, the deadweight cots, that is now borne solely by the debtor.
The lender’s right to repossess is limited to the capital the debtor owns, imposing a
repossession constraint:
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kr(s) Æ kb (7.3)
In addition to purchasing, capital can be also leased at rate l per unit of capital.
The lease payment needs to be made in advance so that an agent leasing kl units of
capital makes a lease payment of lkl at time 0. This gives the agent the right to use
the capital until time 1, at which point the depreciated leased capital is returned
to the lessor and no other payments are made. Hence the repossession technology
available for the lessor is superior over the one available for the lender who can only
repossess a fraction ◊ of the value of the depreciated capital.
The disadvantage of leasing is that in leasing the ownership and control are separated
causing an agency problem. This results in greater wear and tear and the leased
capital depreciates faster than owned capital, i.e. ”l > ” , where ”l œ (0, 1) is the
rate of depreciation of leased capital. Now it is assumed that 1 ≠ ”l > ◊(1 ≠ ”) ,
so that the value of depreciated leased capital at time 1 is always greater than the
value depreciated purchased capital that a secured lender can repossess.
7.4 Lessor’s problem
The leasing market is competitive and the lessors take the leasing rate l as given. In
order to provide capital kl to lease at time 0, the lessors need to first buy it. They
buy the capital from the same market as all other agents and they face the same
prices. The lessor can sell the repossessed depreciated capital kl(1 ≠ ”l) at a price
of 1 per unit of capital at time 1. Moreover it is assumed that the lessor’s have the
same requirements for return on their capital as the lenders do so that they discount
their cash flow at rate R. A profit maximizing lessor’s problem is then
max
kl
lkl ≠ kl +R≠1kl(1≠ ”l),
where lk is the lease payment received at time 0, k is the cost of the leased capital
and R≠1kl(1 ≠ ”l) is the present value of the depreciated leased capital. The first
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order condition for the problem is
l ≠ 1 +R≠1(1≠ ”l) = 0 (7.4)
Solving (7.4) for l gives the equilibrium lease rate lú = 1≠R≠1(1≠”l) and the lessors
make zero profit at the equilibrium.2
7.5 Lessee’s problem
The lessee agents are assumed to be risk neutral and their ex-ante preferences are
represented by a utility function
ÿ
sœS
ﬁ(s) [a(s)k– + (1≠ ”)kb ≠ (1≠ ”)(1≠ ◊)kr(s)≠ Rb] (7.5)
The first term inside the brackets is the cash flow from the capital investment in
state s at time 1, the second term is the value of depreciated owned capital, the
third term is the deadweight cost of repossession and the last term is the repayment
of debt. That is the agent’s utility is represented by the expected value of their
investment decision. The agent’s budget constraint at time 0 is
e+ b = lkl + kb (7.6)
i.e. the agent’s initial endowment, e, plus his net debt has to equal the sum of the
lease payment and the cost of purchased capital 3.
2Notice that the lessors net financing need at time 0 is kl ≠ lkl = R≠1(1 ≠ ”l)kl, where the first
term on the left hand side is the purchasing cost of the asset to be leased and the second term
is the lease payment the lessor receives at the beginning of the lease period.
3This is di erent from the preferences and budget constraint presented by Eisfeldt and Rampini.
In their model the agents can pay dividends and the agent’s objective is to maximize the sum
of (non-discounted) dividends over time. The utility function (7.5) lacks the intuitive appeal of
representing the present value of future dividend stream and thus being the classical company
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The agent takes the leasing cost l and the interest rate R as given and chooses the
amount of capital to lease, kl, the amount of capital to buy, kb, the amount of capital
allowed to be repossessed, kr(s) , to repay the loan at each state s, and the amount
to borrow or save, b, so that it maximizes the expected value of investment (7.5) at
time 1 subject to constraints (7.1) - (7.3) and (7.6).
7.5.1 Lease or buy
Consider first a scenario where the agent can finance a capital investment only
either by leasing or borrowing, but financing an investment using any combination
of leasing and debt is not allowed. The cash flows and costs of these alternative
financing options are illustrated in Figure 7.1 on page 47.
Figure 7.1: Lease or buy
We are assuming that the cost of leased capital CL(kl) = Rlkl is always higher than
the cost of capital financed with debt, CB(kb) = [R≠ (1≠ ”)] kb+(1≠”)(1≠◊)kr(s),
valuation formula. Eisfeldt and Rampini, however, assume implicitly that the shareholders, who
receive the dividends at time 0 would save them whereas here the unconstrained agents save
the funds themselves. Furthermore by assuming that the agents don’t discount the dividends
at time 1, Eisfeldt and Rampini ensure that the time 0 dividends are zero. Therefore the
preferences represented by (7.5) and budget constraint (7.6) are equivalent to the model of
Eisfeldt and Rampini.
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but the amount the agents can borrow is limited by the requirement for full collateral
on the loan. Since only a fraction ◊ of the value of the depreciated capital can be
used as collateral, the maximum loan the agent can get at time 0 with capital kb
as collateral is b = R≠1◊(1 ≠ ”)kb . Thus the minimum need for internal funds per
unit of owned capital is 1≠R≠1◊(1≠ ”) that is greater than the equilibrium leasing
rate l = 1≠R≠1◊(1≠ ”l) given our assumption ”l > ” . Hence leasing allows agents
with limited internal funds to expand their capacity faster than when relying on
borrowing the additional funds needed for the investment.
The agents with the least internal funds are severely constrained by the collateral re-
quirements. In Figure 7.1 on page 47 k0 is the level of capital the agent could finance
with debt and the corresponding expected revenue is F (k0) =
q
sœS ﬁ(s)a(s)k–0 . Us-
ing more costly leasing the agent can, however, reach capital level k1 and expected
cash flow F (k1). The expected profit at point k1 is CD that is greater than the profit
that can be achieved at point k0, and thus a profit maximizing agent is leasing all
its capital.
Consider then an agent with higher internal funds that enable financing capital k2
using debt. Now the expected profit is ef and even though the agent could get access
to more capital by using leasing he cannot increase his expected profits because of the
higher cost of leased capital and diminishing marginal returns on capital investment.
7.5.2 Lease and buy
When an investment can be financed using both leasing and debt at the same time,
we can write the Lagrangian for the lessee’s maximization problem
L(kl, kb, kr(s), b) =
ÿ
sœS
ﬁ(s) [a(s)k– + (1≠ ”)kb ≠ (1≠ ”)(1≠ ◊)kr(s)≠ Rb]
+µ0 [e+ b≠ lkl ≠ kb]
+⁄c [◊(1≠ ”)kb ≠Rb] +
ÿ
sœS
⁄p(s) [a(s)k– + ◊(1≠ ”)kr(s)≠ Rb]
+
ÿ
sœS
⁄r(s) [kb ≠ kr(s)]
+›lkl + ›bkb +
ÿ
sœS
›r(s)kr(s)
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In order to simplify the problem we assume that the cash flow at time 1 in state L
is zero, i.e. a(L) = 0, and the only option for and agent in state L is to repay with
repossessed capital. The agent is strictly better o  by paying the minimal amount
possible and thus the repayment constraint in low state must be always binding.
Furthermore we also make an assumption that in state H the cash flow generated is
greater than the depreciated value of the capital, i.e. a(H)k– > (1≠”)k. Combining
this with the collateral constraint (7.1) gives then a(H)k– > (1 ≠ ”) (kl + kb) >
◊(1≠ ”)kb Ø Rb(H) so that the repayment constraint is a slack in the state H and
⁄p(H) = 0. Moreover, when the cash flow alone is greater than the repayment,
a(H)k– > Rb(H), there is no repossession in state H since allowing repossession
would diminish the agent’s utility due to the dead weight cost involved. Hence
kr(H) = 0 which also implies that in stateH the repossession constraint is redundant
and we can set ⁄r(H) = 0.
Since the objective function is linear and the constraint set is convex the first order
conditions for the problem are necessary and su cient. Furthermore due to the
nature of the problem the budget constraint is always binding. The Kuhn–Tucker
first order conditions for the optimal solution can be now written as
µ0l = ﬁ(H)–a(H)k–≠1 + ›l (7.7)
µ0 = ﬁ(H)–a(H)k–≠1 + (1≠ ”) + ⁄c◊(1≠ ”) + ⁄r(L) + ›b (7.8)
ﬁ(L)(1≠ ”)(1≠ ◊) = ⁄p(L)◊(1≠ ”)≠ ⁄r(L) + ›r(L) (7.9)
µ0 = [1 + ⁄c + ⁄p(L)]R (7.10)
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e+ b≠ lkl ≠ kb = 0 (7.11)
⁄c [◊(1≠ ”)kb ≠Rb] = 0 (7.12)
◊(1≠ ”)kb Ø Rb (7.13)
a(H)k– Ø Rb (7.14)
◊(1≠ ”)kr(L) = Rb (7.15)
⁄r(L) [kb ≠ kr(L)] = 0 (7.16)
kb Ø kr(L) (7.17)
›lkl = ›bkb = ›r(L)kr(L) = 0 (7.18)
kl Ø 0, kb Ø 0, kr(L) Ø 0 (7.19)
As we saw in Section 7.5.1 the agent’s optimal choice is determined by the availability
of his internal funds. The degree into which the agent is constrained is characterized
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by the multiplier of time 0 budget constraint, where large values of µ0 are associated
with most constrained agents.4
The agents with least internal funds lease all their capital, kl > 0, ›l = 0 and
kb = 0. Using (7.7) we get µ0 = ﬁ(H)–a(H)k
–≠1
l , where the numerator ﬁ(H)–a(H)k–≠1
is the expected marginal return of the production on capital and the lease rate l is
the marginal cost of capital. Hence µ0 can be interpreted as the marginal return
on internal funds, that is the shadow price of internal funds. Using (7.11) and
remembering that kb = 0 we get k = kl = e/l so that amount of capital invested is
increasing with endowment.
As the amount of total capital invested, k, increases the marginal return on ad-
ditional capital investment into production technology diminishes and eventually
reaches a point where the cost of leased capital no more justifies the faster ex-
pansion of productive capital allowed by leasing. However, agents with higher in-
ternal funds can also use debt to finance their capital investment needs, kl > 0,
kb > 0 and ›l = ›b = 0. They borrow the maximum amount they can, and in
low state they have to repay with repossessed capital as they don’t have any cash
flow. Thus collateral constraint (7.13) and repossession constraint (7.17) are bind-
ing, and kr(L) = kb > 0 and ›r(L) = 0. Using (7.7), (7.8), (7.9) and (7.10) we
get µ10 = Rﬁ(H)(1≠”)(1≠◊)1≠”l≠◊(1≠”) . Remembering that µ0 is the marginal return on internal
funds this result has the following intuitive interpretation: substituting one unit
of leased capital with owned capital at time 0 requires additional internal funds of
(1≠R≠1◊(1≠ ”))≠ l= (1≠R≠1◊(1≠ ”))≠ (1≠R≠1(1≠ ”l)) = R≠1(1≠ ”l≠◊(1≠ ”)),
but gives the agent at time 1 in state H the share of depreciated capital financed
with internal funds (1≠◊)(1≠ ”). Notice that µ10 does not depend on e and thus the
agent keeps the amount of capital constant and uses any additional internal funds
to substitute away from leased capital by borrowing and buying the capital.
The amount of leased capital, kl, an agent has reaches it’s maximum just before an
agent with increasing internal funds starts to replace capital with debt, i.e. when
µ0 approaches µ10 from above. Solving ﬁ(H)–a(H)k
–≠1
1≠R≠1(1≠”l) =
Rﬁ(H)(1≠”)(1≠◊)
1≠”l≠◊(1≠”) for k gives the
maximum amount of leased capital
4Associating large values of µ0 with most constrained agents is consistent with the interpretation
of µ0 as the shadow price of the time 0 budget constraint. The higher the shadow price the
higher the marginal value of the internal funds are for the agent.
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k =
C
(R + ”l ≠ 1)(1≠ ◊)(1≠ ”)
–a(H) [1≠ ”l ≠ ◊(1≠ ”)]
D 1
–≠1
= kl,max (7.20)
The substitution of leased capital with owned capital continues until the agent owns
all the capital, kl = 0. He is still maximizing the debt within the limits of the
collateral constraint and all the capital is repossessed in state L, kl = 0, kb > 0 and
›b = 0, ◊(1≠ ”)kb = Rb, kr(L) > 0 and ›r(L) = 0. Using now (7.8), (7.9) and (7.10)
we get µ0 = ﬁ(H)(–a(H)k
–≠1+(1≠◊)(1≠”))
1≠R≠1◊(1≠”) , where k =
e
1≠R≠1◊(1≠”) . The numerator in µ0
is the marginal return on capital that is externally financed ﬁ(H)(–a(H)k–≠1+(1≠
◊)(1 ≠ ”)), i.e. the expected cash flow plus the expected value of the depreciated
capital financed with external funds. The denominator is the cost of capital in terms
of internal funds 1 ≠ R≠1◊(1 ≠ ”). Notice that since k = e1≠R≠1◊(1≠”) , the agent is
again investing into more capital when the amount of internal funds, e, increase.
The production technology has diminishing marginal return on capital and when the
amount of invested capital gets su ciently high, it is no more economical to expand
and invest into more production capital using external funds. This is because ex-
ternal funds carry the associated deadweight cost of repossession with them. When
the share of internal funds in investment increases, the collateral constraint is no
more binding and ⁄c = 0. Using (7.13) and (7.15) we get kb > kr(L) ∆ ⁄r(L) = 0.
Hence the repossession constraint is a slack and only a fraction of the capital is
repossessed in low state lowering the repossession costs. Notice, however, that as
long as debt is used capital will be repossessed in low state so that kr(L) > 0 and
›r(L) = 0. Together with (7.9) and (7.10) this implies µ20 = [ﬁ(H) + ◊≠1ﬁ(L)]R =
ﬁ(L)(1≠◊)(1≠”)+◊(1≠”)
R≠1◊(1≠”) , where R≠1◊(1 ≠ ”) = 1 ≠ [1≠R≠1◊(1≠ ”)], is the cost of sub-
stituting debt with internal funds, ﬁ(L)(1 ≠ ◊)(1 ≠ ”) is the expected savings on
repossession costs and ◊(1 ≠ ”) = Rbk≠1b is the marginal interest saving on lower
debt. Notice that µ20 is independent of the amount of internal funds e and hence
the agent keeps the total amount invested capital constant and uses any additional
internal funds to replace debt.
The substitution of debt with internal funds continues until b = 0. After that
the agent starts to invest into new capital again, but this time using only internal
funds, that is kl = 0, b = 0, kb > 0 and ›b = 0. Furthermore as the agent is
not using debt the collateral constraint is not binding, ⁄c = 0, and there is no
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repossession, ⁄r(L) = 0. Using (7.8) and (7.11) we get the return on internal funds,
µ0 = ﬁ(H)–a(H)e–≠1 + (1≠ ”) , that is the expected marginal production plus the
value of depreciated capital. The investment into additional capital using internal
funds continues until µ30 = R . When µ0 becomes smaller than R, investing more
internal funds to production capital gives lower return than the capital markets are
o ering and therefore the agent is better o  by saving any additional internal funds.
7.6 Equilibrium
In Section 7.4 we showed that there is a leasing rate at which there are lessor’s willing
to o er financial lease contracts. In Section 7.5 we showed that firms with limited
internal funds but good growth prospects prefer leasing over secured debt, and the
fraction of leased capital is decreasing in the amount of internal funds available.
An equilibrium is defined by interest rate R, leasing rate l = 1 ≠ R≠1(1 ≠ ”l) and
a capital allocation where the firms maximize their utility taking interest rate and
leasing rate while the capital market clears
ÿ
eœE
p(e)
ÿ
sœS
ﬁ(s)b(s; e) +
ÿ
eœE
p(e)R≠1kl(e)(1≠ ”l) = 0
where p(e) is the density of agents with endowment e. The first term on the left is
aggregate direct net debt in the economy held by the agents and the second term is
the total amount of financing required by the leasing firms.
The extent into which leasing is utilized is thus dependent on the distribution of
internal funds across the agents. The more there are firms with limited internal
funds the more leasing we should expect to see. Limited internal funds are also
likely to be correlated with low tax rates. Therefore the tax incentives discussed in
Chapter 6 are likely to benefit the same firms that resort to leasing because of lack
of internal funds.
The amount of leased capital is also increasing in the collateral requirement, that can
be seen by di erentiating (7.20) with respect to ◊, ˆkl,maxˆ◊ =
”≠”l
(1≠◊)(1≠–)[1≠”l≠◊(1≠”)]kl,max <
0. Thus the higher the repossession cost and consequently the higher the collateral
requirement (smaller ◊), the more the agents are expected to use leased capital.
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Higher collateral requirement increases the leverage for faster capital expansion of-
fered by leasing making it more lucrative for agents with limited internal funds. This
finding is also aligned with the conclusions on the impact of equity requirements in
Chapter 6.
Di erentiating kl,max with respect to R gives ˆkl,maxˆR =
kl,max
(R+”l≠1)(–≠1) < 0, and hence
other things equal the extent of leasing should be decreasing in interest rates, that
is the opposite to the prediction we got in Chapter 6 when considering the tax in-
centives for leasing. When the interest rates are increasing the cost of debt increases
and the present value of the salvage value of the capital decreases, both influencing
the return on internal funds negatively when investment is financed with debt. The
equilibrium lease rate l is, however, also dependent on R, and increases faster than
the cost of debt in terms of internal funds when R is increasing.
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8 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis has been to try to identify the reasons and the underlying
conditions for leasing being preferred to owning when financing capital investment
projects.
First we showed that in a neoclassical world where the assumptions of the Modigliani–
Miller and the CAPM theorems hold, there are no purely financial reasons to either
lease or own assets and hence all the agents should be indi erent between owning
and leasing.
When relaxing the CAPM value maximization framework we found that a utility
maximizing risk averse agent would prefer leasing to owning an asset when there is
uncertainty in the residual value of the asset, and when the lease terms o ered by
a risk neutral or less risk averse lessor operating in a competitive leasing market.
Another case when leasing would be also preferred to owning is when the lessee has
a lower expectation about the future value of the asset that the lessor. Avoiding the
risk in the future value of the property could be one of the reasons explaining why
leasing so common in housing services. The variation in property prices are often
large compared to the wealth of households and rental apartments o er a way for
individuals to avoid the inherent risk in property prices.
Another reason to prefer leasing to owning that is also intuitive in the context of
housing services is limitations on access to financial markets. More specifically when
the user of an asset can borrow only limited amounts and has to finance part of the
purchase with internal funds, leasing can provide access to faster capacity expansion
and higher utility than would be possible with owned assets. This is not however
limited to utility maximizing individuals but also applies to value maximizing firms.
Finally we also presented how taxation and accelerated schedule for tax depreciation
can provide an incentive for leasing. When using leased assets a firm with a lower
marginal tax rate can transfer the right to the tax shields to a firm with higher
marginal tax rate. The potential for the tax arbitrage from leasing is greater the
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greater the spread in marginal tax rates and hence we should expect to see decline in
the share of leasing used by firms as many industrialized countries including Finland
are lowering their corporate tax rates. At the same time, however, the higher capital
requirements imposed on banks are translating into stricter lending standards and
hence higher collateral requirements, that is likely to increase the popularity of
leasing.
The value of the tax arbitrage gained through the present value of accelerated tax
depreciation is however relatively small in case of e.g. Finnish corporate tax rates
and normal interest rates and hence the tax incentive to leasing is not likely to be
very significant factor except perhaps in the largest investment projects.
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